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1 Introduction
A rapidly growing literature following Sasaki and Toda (1996) extends the
classical matching theory pioneered by Gale and Shapley (1962) to problems
with externalities. In this literature individuals in the matching environment
care about the matches of other individuals, as well. More formally, individu-
als have preferences over the set of matchings, instead of preferences over the
set of potential partners. While Sasaki and Toda (1996) and some researchers
in the field (e.g., Chowdhury, 2004; Hafalir, 2008; Mumcu and Saglam, 2008,
2010; Fisher and Hafalir, 2016) confined their analysis to marriage markets
(or one-to-one matchings), the related literature has extended over the past
years to many settings, including college admissions (e.g., Echenique and
Yenmez, 2007), job markets (e.g., Dutta and Masso´, 1997; Alcalde and Re-
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villa, 2004; Revilla, 2004; Klaus and Klijn, 2005; Bando, 2012, 2014), and
housing markets (e.g., Mumcu and Saglam, 2007; Salgado-Torres, 2011).
In this paper, we consider strategic issues in one-to-one matching with ex-
ternalities, using a stability concept earlier introduced by Mumcu and Saglam
(2008, 2010) for one-to-one matching problems and modified by Bando (2012)
for many-to-one matching problems (to ensure the existence of stable match-
ings). Despite the wide range of applications of the theory of matching
with externalities, the strategic issues have not been studied much in the
literature, where the main focus has invariably been the existence of sta-
ble matchings and algorithms that produce stable matchings. On the other
hand, the stability concepts in these applications varies a lot. As in the
classical matching theory, a matching is assumed to be stable under exter-
nalities if it is not individually or pairwise blocked. But, in case a matching
is blocked and changed, the welfare of every individual in the society may
be affected due to externalities. Therefore, whether or not some individuals
will block a matching when externalities are present depends, among other
things, what these deviating individuals expect will happen to the actions
of the rest of the society about keeping or changing their matches. These
expectations of the (potentially) deviating pairs are called estimation func-
tions in Sasaki and Toda (1996). Formally, an estimation function consists
of the set of all matchings a pair of man and woman expect to form if they
pairwise block a matching. A pair of individuals can block a matching if
each of them becomes better off under all matchings predicted by his/her
estimation function. Sasaki and Toda (1996) showed that any marriage mar-
ket has a stable matching (but not necessarily a core matching) if and only
if every individual has a universal estimation function, i.e. he/she believes
all matchings are possible. Hafalir (2008) relaxed this extremely strong exis-
tence condition by endogenizing the estimation functions on the preferences
of other individuals. Deviating slightly from this line, Mumcu and Saglam
(2008, 2010) introduced a different notion of stability according to which the
deviating individuals believe that the other individuals will not change their
actions while blocking occurs. They showed that under this stronger stability
concept, for any marriage market with externalities where there are at least
three individuals (involving at least one pair of man and woman), one can
always find a preference profile under which the stable set, and consequently
the core, is empty. Moreover, the core and the stable set may be different
if the society involves at least two pairs. Mumcu and Saglam (2010) further
characterized conditions on preferences that are sufficient for the existence
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of a nonempty stable set in any society.
Using the stability concept used by Mumcu and Saglam (2010), we show
in this paper that in the presence of externalities no core (stable) mechanism
is strategy-proof, extending an impossibility result of Roth (1982) obtained
in the absence of externalities. Moreover, we show that there are no limits
on successful manipulation of preferences by coalitions of men and women,
in contrast with the result of Demange et al. (1987) obtained in the absence
of externalities.
The literature that deals with strategic issues in matching with external-
ities is quite sparse. The most related works, to the best of our knowledge,
are Klaus and Klijn (2005), Kucuksenel (2011), and Kojima et al. (2013).
Of these, Klaus and Klijn (2005) considered couples markets in many-to-
one (hospital-doctor) matching problems and provided a maximal domain of
preferences (the class of weakly responsive preferences) that ensures the ex-
istence of stable matchings. Given this domain, they also showed that there
exists no stable matching mechanism under which reporting the true prefer-
ences is always a dominant strategy for every couple in the market, whereas
the stable matching mechanism that yields the hospital-optimal matching
makes it a dominant strategy for each hospital to report its true preferences.
Kucuksenel (2011) considered college admissions problems allowing students
to have preferences over other students attending to the same college, and
proposed a sequential mechanism that implements the core. More recently,
Kojima et al. (2013) reconsidered the couples problem in hospital-doctor
markets, in the absence of the sufficient condition provided by Klaus and
Klijn (2005), and showed that if the matching market (the number of hospi-
tals) is large enough, then the probability that a stable matching does not
exist can be made arbitrarily small, and also the truth-telling can arise as an
approximate equilibrium behavior for all players in the market, namely doc-
tors, couples, and hospitals. All of these works, being concerned with some
real-life practices, consider externalities only among a group of individuals
who are on the same side of the market. As a matter of fact, in Klaus and
Klijn (2005) and Kojima et al. (2013) individuals face no externalities if they
are not couples, and in Kucuksenel (2011) students face no externalities if
they do not attend to the same college. Besides, externalities among hospi-
tals (or among colleges) and cross externalities among hospitals and doctors
(or colleges and students) are not considered, either. To make a contrast
with these studies, we should say that our treatment of externalities is more
general, as we allow any kind of externalities between any two individuals
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in the society regardless whether they are on the same side, or on opposite
sides, of the matching market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we formally
present our basic structures and in Section 3 we give our results. Finally, we
conclude in Section 4.
2 Basic Structures
We consider a society that involves a set of men, M and a set of women, W ,
which are non-empty, finite, and disjoint. Let N =M ∪W . A matching is a
one-to-one function µ : N → N such that for any i ∈ N we have µ2(i) = i,
for anym ∈M if µ(m) 6= m then µ(m) ∈ W , and for any w ∈ W if µ(w) 6= w
then µ(w) ∈M . Let MN denote the set of all matchings for the society N .
Given any matching µ and any pair of individuals m and w, we denote by
µm,w a particular matching that is obtained from µ by marrying m and w.
If these two individuals are not already married under µ, then their spouses
(if any) also become unmarried under µm,w, while the spouses of all other
individuals (if any) remain the same. Also, for any i ∈ N , we denote by µi,i
a matching obtained from µ by divorcing i from his/her spouse µ(i) (if any)
and keeping them both unmarried under µi,i, while holding the spouses of
all other individuals (if any) unchanged.
Each individual has a complete, transitive, and strict preference relation
over the matchings inMN . Let Pi denote the set of such preference relations
for individual i ∈ N and let P =
∏
i∈N Pi. For any µ, µ
′ ∈ MN , i ∈ N , and
Pi ∈ Pi, we write µPi µ
′ to say that individual i strictly prefers µ to µ′.
Also, for any k = 1, 2, . . . , |MN | and i ∈ N , we write (Pi[k]) to denote
the kth ranked matching from top with respect to preference relation Pi of
individual i. We denote a marriage market by a triple (M,W,P ). Also, we
say that a market (M,W,P ) has externalities if P ∈ Pi.
A matching µ is acceptable to individual i if either µPi µi,i or µ = µi,i. An
individual individually blocks a matching µ if µ is not acceptable to him/her.
A matching is individually rational if it is acceptable to each individual.
We say that (m,w) is a blocking pair for a matching µ if m and w are not
matched to each other at µ and both prefer the matching µm,w, where they
are matched to each other, to µ. A matching is stable if it is individually
rational and if there are no blocking pairs for it. Let S(M,W,P ) denote the
set of all stable matchings for the marriage market (M,W,P ).
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A set M ′ ∪W ′ of men and women, where M ′ ⊆ M and W ′ ⊆ W , is a
blocking coalition for a matching µ ∈ MN if there exists another matching
µ′ ∈MN such that
i) at µ′ each individual i in M ′ ∪W ′ becomes either single or matched to an
individual (of opposite gender) in M ′ ∪W ′,
ii) the spouse µ(i) to which individual i ∈M ′ ∪W ′ is matched at µ becomes
unmatched at µ′ if µ(i) is outside M ′ ∪W ′,
iii) if individual i is outside the coalition M ′ ∪W ′, then his/her spouse (if
any) is the same at µ and µ′, and
iv) µ′Pi µ for all i ∈M
′ ∪W ′.
A matching is called a core matching if there are no blocking coalitions for
it. Let C(M,W,P ) denote the set of all core matchings (or simply the core)
for the marriage market (M,W,P ). Apparently, C(M,W,P ) ⊆ S(M,W,P ).
As shown by Mumcu and Saglam (2010), for any society with at least three
individuals there exists a preference profile under which the stable set, and
consequently the core, is empty. In addition, if the society involves at least
four individuals, then the core and the stable set may be different.
Now, we are ready to consider strategic issues. Consider a marriage mar-
ket where the matching of individuals is determined by a central authority,
based on a list of preference relations that individuals state for themselves.
A mechanism, Γ, is a procedure which determines a matching for each mar-
riage market (M,W,P ). If the list of preference relations reported by the
individuals is Q =
∏
i∈N Qi where Qi is the report of individual i, the mech-
anism produces a matching Γ[Q]. If Γ[Q] is always stable with respect to Q,
the mechanism Γ is called a stable matching mechanism. Moreover, if Γ[Q]
is always in the core with respect to Q, the mechanism Γ is called a core
mechanism. Also, a mechanism Γ is called strategy-proof if for all P ∈ P and
for each i ∈ N it is true that Γ[P ]Pi Γ[Qi, P−i] for all Qi ∈ Pi.
3 Results
Roth (1982) shows that for any marriage market where preference relations
are strict and no externalities are present, there is no stable matching mech-
anism (equivalently, no core mechanism) which is strategy-proof. This result
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remains to hold under externalities.
Proposition 1. For any marriage market where |M ||W | ≥ 2 and external-
ities are present, there is no core mechanism which is strategy-proof.
Proof. First consider the case |M ||W | = 2. Without loss of generality,
assume M = {m1,m2} and W = {w1}. The possible matchings are
µ1 = w1m2; µ2 = m1w1; µ3 = m1m2;
where at each matching the listed two individuals denote the matches of m1
and m2, respectively. Consider the preference profile P ∈ P given by
Pm1 = µ2µ1µ3; Pm2 = µ1µ2µ3; Pw1 = µ1µ2µ3.
It is easy to check that S(M,W,P ) = C(M,W,P ) = {µ1, µ2}. So, any
stable mechanism must choose µ1 or µ2 when the preference report is P .
Suppose the mechanism chooses µ1. If m1 misreports his/her preference
relation as Qm1 = µ2µ3µ1 while everyone else makes truthful revelations, then
at the reported profile (Qm1 , Pm2 , Pw1), µ2 becomes the unique matching in
the core, which is preferred by m1 to µ1 at his/her true preference relation
Pm1 . So, it is not a dominant strategy for all individuals to truthfully reveal
their preference relations. Similarly, if the mechanism chooses µ2 when P is
reported, then m2 can profitably misrepresent his/her preference relation as
Qm2 = µ1µ3µ2 to force the mechanism to select µ1.
To show that the above result generalizes to the case of |M ||W | ≥ 2, we
consider any society N ′ =M ′∪W ′ ⊃ N and pick any µ ∈MN . We define the
extended matching µN
′
over MN
′
in such a way that all newcomers become
single. That is,
µN
′
(j) =
{
µ(j) if j ∈ N
j if j ∈ N ′\N.
Following Mumcu and Saglam (2010), we will construct a preference profile
P ′ of N ′ in such a way that the core (and the stable set) for the marriage
markets (M,W,P ) and (M ′,W ′, P ′) will be the same. So, let P ′ satisfy
(i) for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |MN |},
(P ′i [k]) =
{
(Pi[k])
N ′ if i ∈ N
(Pj[k])
N ′ if i ∈ N ′\N,
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for some j ∈ N which is of the same gender as i;
(ii) for all µ′ ∈ MN
′
, for all i ∈ N ′\N and for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |MN |} such
that µ′ 6= (P ′i[k]), it is true that µ
′
i,i P
′
i µ
′ if µ′ 6= µ′i,i.
It should be clear that S(M ′,W ′, P ′) = S(M,W,P ) and C(M ′,W ′, P ′) =
C(M,W,P ). Thus, the result for |M ||W | = 2 remains to hold. 
Proposition 1 shows that there exists no core (or stable) mechanism which
will never give any individual an incentive to misrepresent his or her prefer-
ence relation. The below proposition which strengthens the above impossi-
bility result states that there always exists at least one individual who will
behave strategically under a core mechanism when all other individuals act
truthfully.
Proposition 2. Consider any marriage market (M,W,P ), where min{|M |,
|W |} = 2 and externalities are present, such that (i) there is more than
one stable matching in the core, (ii) every individual is married at any core
matching, (iii) the matching at which every individual is single is bottom
ranked by at least two men and two women, (iv) if a matching outside the
core is such that some individuals are married, then this matching is unac-
ceptable to at least one of these married individuals in the society. If any
core mechanism is applied to this market, then at least one individual can
profitably misreport his or her preference relation, whenever the others report
truthfully.
Proof. Consider a marriage market (M,W,P ) satisfying the hypotheses of
the theorem. Suppose that when all individuals reveal their true preference
relations in P , the core mechanism Γ selects matching ν. By assumption (i),
the core of this market, C(M,W,P ), contains at least two stable matchings.
Let j be some individual who does not top rank ν in his/her preference
relation. (There must exist such an individual, since |C(M,W,P )| ≥ 2 by
assumption (i).) Let ν ′ denote the core matching that individual j prefers
most. Suppose j misreports his/her preference relation as Qj that satisfies
the following properties:
(1) (Qj[1]) = ν
′;
(2) if µ ∈MN\{ν ′} is such that µ(j) 6= j, then µj,j Qj µ;
(3) if µ = (Pj[|M
N |]) is such that µ(j) 6= j, then µ = (Qj[|M
N |]);
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(4) if µ ∈ MN\{ν ′} is such that µ /∈ C(M,W,P ) and µ(j) 6= j, then
µj,j Qj µ.
Suppose that all individuals, except for j, truthfully report their pref-
erence relations. Denote the reported preference profile by Pˆ = (Qj, P−j).
First consider any matching µ in C(M,W,P )\{ν ′}. By assumption (ii),
µ 6= µk,k for any k ∈ N . Then, property (2) implies µj,j Qj µ, there-
fore µ /∈ C(M,W, Pˆ ). Now, consider the matching µs at which every in-
dividual is single. Since only one individual (individual j) in the society
misreports his/her preference relation, assumption (iii) ensures (irrespec-
tive of the report of individual j) that there exist at least one man and
one woman who rank µs at the bottom with respect to their preference re-
lations. Since such a pair of man and woman can pairwise block µs by
marrying to each other, µs /∈ C(M,W, Pˆ ). Finally, consider any matching
µ /∈ C(M,W,P ) ∪ {µs}. Clearly, some individuals are married at µ since
µ 6= µs. If µ(j) 6= j, then property (4) ensures that individual j blocks µ via
µj,j. If µ(j) = j, then assumption (iv) ensures that there exists some indi-
vidual k ∈ N\{j} such that µ(k) 6= k and µk,k Pk µ, implying that individual
k will block µ. Therefore, µ /∈ C(M,W, Pˆ ). So far, we have proved that if
µ ∈ MN\{ν ′}, then µ /∈ C(M,W, Pˆ ). Finally, property (1) of Qj and the
fact that ν ′ ∈ C(M,W,P ) together ensure ν ′ ∈ C(M,W, Pˆ ). So, we must
have Γ(Pˆ ) = C(M,W, Pˆ ) = {ν ′}. Since ν ′ Pj ν and ν = Γ(Pˆ ), the report Qj
makes individual j better-off. 
A result by Demange et al. (1987) shows that in any marriage mar-
ket where preference relations are strict and no externalities are present, no
coalition of men and women can manipulate their preference relations so suc-
cessfully that every member of the coalition prefers one of the new outcomes
to every stable (core) outcome (with respect to the true preference relations).
Below, we prove that such limits on successful manipulation do not exist in
the presence of externalities.
Proposition 3. For any marriage market where min{|M |, |W |} ≥ 2 and
externalities are present, there exist two preference profiles P and Pˆ , where
Pˆ differs from P for some coalition G of men and women, such that there
exists a matching µ in C(M,W, Pˆ ) which is preferred to every matching in
C(M,W,P ) under P by all members of G.
8
Proof. First consider the case M = {m1,m2} and W = {w1, w2}. Clearly,
min{|M |, |W |} = 2. The seven possible matchings are
µ1 = w1, w2; µ2 = m1, w2; µ3 = w2,m2; µ4 = m1, w1;
µ5 = w2, w1; µ6 = w1,m2; µ7 = m1,m2;
and the preference profile is given by
Pm1 = µ3µ1µ4µ5µ2µ6µ7 Pm2 = µ1µ4µ5µ2µ3µ6µ7
Pw1 = µ1µ4µ5µ2µ3µ6µ7 Pw2 = µ3µ4µ1µ5µ2µ6µ7.
It is easy to check that S(M,W,P ) = C(M,W,P ) = {µ4}. Now sup-
pose that the singleton coalition {m1} misrepresents his/her preference re-
lation as Pˆm1 = µ1µ3µ4µ5µ2µ6µ7. Define Pˆ = (Pˆ
m1 , P−m1). We then have
S(M,W, Pˆ ) = C(M,W, Pˆ ) = {µ1, µ4}. Clearly, m1 prefers µ1 ∈ C(M,W, Pˆ )
to µ4, the unique matching in C(M,W,P ). The result immediately follows
for any larger society N ′ = M ′ ∪ W ′ with min{|M ′|, |W ′|} > 2, if the all
matchings in MN are extended to MN
′
such that all individuals in N ′\N
become single and the preference profile P ′ of N ′ is obtained from P by re-
specting the society N as in the proof of Proposition 1. 
When one of the genders has a unique member, we have a weaker result.
Proposition 4. For any marriage market where min{|M |, |W |} = 1 and
externalities are present, there exist two preference profiles P and Pˆ , where
Pˆ differs from P for some coalition G of men and women, such that there
exists a matching µ in C(M,W, Pˆ ) which is weakly preferred to every match-
ing in C(M,W,P ) under P by all members of G.
Proof. Follows from the proof of Proposition 1, where one of the individuals
in the society can manipulate his/her preference relation to make the core
mechanism uniquely select his/her most preferred core matching. 
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered strategic issues in marriage markets with
externalities using the stability concept in Mumcu and Saglam (2008, 2010).
We have showed that no core (stable) mechanism makes truth-telling always
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a dominant strategy for all individuals, extending an earlier result of Roth
(1982) obtained in the absence of externalities. Also, we have found that
there are no limits on successful manipulation of preferences by coalitions
of men and women, in contrast with the result of Demange et al. (1987)
obtained in the absence of externalities.
Future research can fruitfully extend our work to problems with many-to-
one matching, and also study how our results would change in both one-to-
one and many-to-one matching settings if the stability concept used in our
paper were changed with one of the alternative concepts in the literature;
namely, the stability concepts of Sasaki and Toda (1996) or Hafalir (2008)
for one-to-one matching problems and the stability concept of Bando (2012)
for many-to-one matching problems.
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